

ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK 2026



The Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to the Kingdom of Denmark by the Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA) determines the national terrorist threat level and describes the terrorist threat to the Kingdom of Denmark and Danish interests abroad. This assessment is one out of five recurring assessments of threats in and against Denmark. The other assessments are:

- Assessment of the Espionage Threat to Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), which describes foreign state intelligence activities targeting Denmark, particularly espionage, influence activities and illegal procurement of technology and knowledge.
- Intelligence Outlook by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS), which describes the external conditions for Danish national security and interests.
- The cyber threat against Denmark by the Danish Resilience Agency, which describes and determines the national threat levels in relation to cybercrime, cyberespionage, cyberactivism, disruptive cyberattacks and cyberterrorism.
- National risk assessment of terrorist financing by PET, which aims to map terrorist financing in Denmark and abroad.

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PREFACE

The Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to the Kingdom of Denmark is the overall assessment of the terrorist threat to the Kingdom of Denmark and Danish interests abroad by the Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA).

Overall, CTA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark remains at the level of **significant**. Regarding specific threat actors, CTA assesses that the terrorist threat from militant Islamists remains at the level of **significant**, the terrorist threat from right-wing extremists remains at the level of **general**, the terrorist threat from left-wing extremists remains at the level of **limited**, and the terrorist threat from anti-establishment extremists remains at the level of **limited**.

The terrorist threat to Greenland and the Faroe Islands remains at the level of **minimal**.

The terrorist threat to Denmark continues to be driven largely by known ideologically motivated terrorist groups and individuals with recognizable and predictable agendas, objectives and methods. However, the threat landscape has changed significantly in recent years, with new actors and motivations affecting the terrorist threat. This is reflected, for example, in acts of sabotage or violence which, depending on their nature or context, could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism.

Aside from ideologically motivated terrorist groups and individuals, this new threat landscape is particularly shaped by state actors, criminal networks and individuals or small groups driven by single issues or personal agendas. Several of these have overlapping agendas,

objectives and/or *modi operandi*, which makes it challenging to identify the adversary and counter the threat. Because these changes are crucial to understanding the threat landscape, CTA has described some of the new threat actors in more detail than previous years.

Global security developments are among the factors shaping the threat landscape, and state actors have increasingly influenced the terrorist threat over the past year. This is particularly true of Iran, which poses a threat especially to Israeli and Jewish interests in Europe, including Denmark. At the same time, criminal proxies are increasingly used, especially by Iran, to carry out terrorist attacks, which makes the threat more unpredictable.

The war between US, Israel and Iran that broke out on 28th February 2026 has a spillover effect on the threat landscape in the West, including Denmark. CTA assesses that threats may come from a variety of actors, including single-issue actors motivated by the war and actors with ties to either the Iranian regime or terrorist groups. Since the outbreak of the war, there have been attacks on Israeli, Jewish and US interests in the West. The situation remains volatile, and developments both in and outside the Middle East are difficult to predict. This means that the threat landscape in Denmark may also change at very short notice.

In addition, the conflict in Gaza continues to fuel the terrorist threat, mobilizing actors across a broad spectrum – from militant Islamists over left-wing extremists to individuals without a strong ideological foundation, motivated solely by the conflict itself. A lasting peace

agreement between Israel and Hamas would likely diminish the mobilization potential and the effect on the terrorist threat over time, but the conflict will continue to influence the terrorist threat for at least the next year.

Furthermore, a number of other factors have become more prominent over the past year. Individuals and small groups with individually tailored motives and agendas, which do not fit into traditional ideological threat categories, are challenging the authorities' handling of the threat. At the same time, technological developments continue to facilitate and accelerate the spread of extremist messages and content, giving extremist communities and radicalizers significantly greater reach and a wider audience.

Moreover, growing polarization in Western societies increases the risk of the political debate becoming characterized by stark enemy images and aggressive rhetoric, potentially legitimizing violence, especially among vulnerable and susceptible individuals. State actors can exploit polarization to increase distrust between citizens, institutions and authorities, while extremist communities can try to position themselves as an attractive alternative to established Danish society.

Multiple attacks over the past year have demonstrated that traditional threat actors, such as militant Islamists and right-wing extremists, remain among the most significant challenges in the threat landscape. In conjunction with the above-mentioned dynamics and new actors, this contributes to an increasingly complex threat landscape. Thus, to effectively prevent and counter the threat, authorities are faced with ever-increasing demands on their capabilities and partner relations.

PET regularly launches operations to uncover and prevent potential terrorist threats to targets in Denmark. Terrorist attacks may occur with no prior intelligence indications, even when the perpetrators have previously been known to have extremist sympathies.

The Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to the Kingdom of Denmark 2026 is based on intelligence processed before 20th April 2026. ■

¹ CTA is a fusion centre comprised of staff from four Danish authorities (the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the The Danish Resilience Agency) collaborating on analysis of the terrorist threat to the Kingdom of Denmark and Danish interests abroad.

DEFINITIONS

CTA uses the following terrorist threat levels (highlighted in **BROWN**) and degrees of probability (highlighted in **BLUE**).

TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL

Minimal	Limited	General	Significant	Very significant
There are no indications of any threat. There is absence of intent, capability or both.	There is a potential threat. There is limited capability and/or intent.	There is capability and/or intent and possibly planning.	There is a known threat. There is capability, intent and planning.	There is a specific threat. There is capability, intent, planning and possibly initiation.

PROBABILITY

Unlikely	Less likely	Possible	Likely	Highly likely
<10%	10-40%	40-60%	60-90%	>90%

TERM	DEFINITION
Terrorism	CTA defines terrorism in accordance with Section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code.
Extremism	The will to engage in or legitimize violent action in order to change existing societal conditions.
Radicalization	A dynamic process in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, religious or ideological ends.
Capability	Access to resources and the ability (training, skills, logistics, etc.) to utilize them.
Intent	The will to perform, direct, support or inspire acts of terrorism.
The West	North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe, not including Russia, Belarus, Türkiye, Moldova, Ukraine and Caucasus.
Hybridization	A process in which the blending of different ideologies, world views or communities leads to the creation of new extremist narratives and modi operandi among individuals, groups or communities. Not to be confused with hybrid warfare and conflict.

OVERALL TRENDS IN THE THREAT LANDSCAPE



Overall trends in the threat landscape

A number of trends are affecting the current threat landscape across multiple actors. This section examines the significance of online technologies, extreme violence with unclear motives, social, psychological and psychiatric factors, and the conflict in Gaza.

Developments in online technology

CTA assesses that technological developments have fundamentally altered the operating environment for extremist actors and play a significant and increasing role in relation to extremist behaviour.

Online platforms allow individuals to anonymously connect with like-minded people around the world. Thus, geographic distance, age, gender, ethnicity and social status are no longer barriers to engagement in extremist communities. Thereby, new population groups such as minors and mentally vulnerable individuals are gaining access and now constitute a growing part of several extremist communities.


Anonymity and largely unrestricted access to exchanging information and views foster online cultures and communities characterized by boundary-testing behaviour and individualization. CTA assesses that this contributes to a trend whereby several extremist communities are less anchored in rigidly defined ideological frameworks and more influenced by individual interpretations and the blending of methods, aesthetics and ideologies. This is accelerating the rate of change and unpredictability within the communities. CTA has previously examined this trend of individual blending of methods, aesthetics and ideologies in relation to hybridization (see the 2023 version of this publication for a definition and the 2024 and 2025 versions for examples).

BOUNDARY-TESTING BEHAVIOUR ONLINE

Anonymity in online forums can contribute to the erosion of regulating social norms. This makes ambiguous and transgressive language and behaviour more prevalent online than in physical spaces. Boundary-testing behaviour can, in some cases, serve as a stepping stone to extremist communities, partly because extremists have greater latitude in anonymous online forums.

Online platform algorithms support and accelerate the spreading of extremist content. The algorithms prioritize boundary-testing, polarizing and extreme content, because it drives user engagement and, consequently, traffic. As a result, extremist content is often automatically disseminated to a wider audience than the extremist communities would otherwise be able to reach. At the same time, users are offered content similar to their previous interactions, potentially reinforcing a particular bias or directing them toward extremist echo chambers. Individuals with prolonged exposure to extremist content may experience a normalization that can potentially push their boundaries for acceptable behaviour.

Furthermore, CTA assesses that extremist communities actively exploit the algorithms to expand their reach. This is achieved, for instance, by combining highly simplified extremist messages with pop cultural references and emotional content to maximize sharing. It occurs on several widely used online platforms, where communication techniques such as gamification and coded language (see the box on communication techniques) are used to obscure the extremist content from outsiders, including the authorities. Sometimes, the initial contact leads to other platforms offering encryption and little to no moderation, e.g. allowing users to share more explicit extremist content and communicate on attacks and attack planning.



Bots and AI increase the online reach of extremist milieus.

COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES

Extremist communities often develop **coded language**, using, for instance, implicit gaming references, specific expressions or numerical codes. For instance, right-wing extremist communities use the numbers 18 and 88 as numeric references to the first and eighth letters of the alphabet, i.e. AH for "Adolf Hitler" and HH for "Heil Hitler".

Gamification is a technique used to disseminate messages by influencing user behaviour and views through gaming design and techniques. In an extremist context, user activation, rewards and high-score lists can be applied to generate engagement and increase user involvement. This type of content prompts extensive interaction, and its references to popular culture reach an audience far beyond extremist circles. Through its playful elements, gamification can also create a mental distance between a potential offender, the acts of violence and the victims.

The ability of extremist communities to disseminate propaganda is further enhanced by such technologies as automated user accounts (bots) and AI, which enable individuals, including minors, to mass-disseminate propaganda at a high rate. CTA assesses that this dynamic can accelerate, maintain and promote radicalization, and, in the longer term, lead to increased sharing of user-generated propaganda on mainstream platforms. This could potentially expose more people to extremist propaganda.

Online presence increases the resilience and adaptability of extremist communities. For example, interconnected online profiles and channels allow the communities to constantly re-emerge under new names with the same content, even after being shut down. Adaptability is also characteristic of extremist online communities that lack formal leadership, membership or a defined programme, so-called post-organizational networks. Such networks are far more dynamic than traditional membership organizations and are difficult for the authorities to close down.

Extreme violence with unclear motives

The threat landscape in the West is increasingly marked by extreme, violent incidents resembling terrorism, but carried out by individuals with no clear ideological motive. Depending on the specific circumstances, such acts could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism.

EXTREME VIOLENCE WITH AN UNCLEAR MOTIVE

While the examples below have not been prosecuted as terrorism, similar cases could, depending on the specific circumstances, meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism.

In January 2025, a 17-year-old boy attacked a school in Nashville, USA, killing one student and injuring another before committing suicide. In a manifesto, he encouraged others to commit terrorism, sharing advice on how to prepare attacks against politicians, schools, mosques, churches, synagogues, army bases and critical infrastructure, though not in the name of any specific ideology. He asked himself: *"What is your political ideology?"*, and responded: *"I have none. I only support rape."* His manifesto also included extensive references to incel, gore, accelerationism, school attacks, mass murderers, misanthropy, right-wing extremism and nihilism.

In July 2024, another 17-year-old boy attacked three girls aged six to nine in Southport, UK, stabbing them to death, while injuring ten others. The girls were attending a dance event when they were attacked. The boy had a Christian background, and his motive could not be linked to any ideology, only to violence fixation.

The perpetrators are often driven by personal risk factors such as poor well-being, mental vulnerability, personal frustration, a desire for revenge, a need for attention, self-promotion and belief in conspiracy theories. For some perpetrators, the personal risk factors merge with fragments of ideology and symbolism adopted from extremist communities and known terrorist actors, and are then channelled into extreme acts of violence. In such cases, the specific ideology is not a determining factor in the violence, but it may instil in the perpetrator a feeling of serving a greater cause and a sense of belonging, while also influencing target selection. However, perpetrators with an unclear ideological affiliation often select targets in close proximity to their home and/or within their own environment. CTA notes that - as a result of this change in the threat landscape - schools can be a potential target for young perpetrators in this category.

In many cases, the perpetrators are connected to violence-fixated online cultures that are often linked to the phenomenon gore (see box). This may include communities sharing a fascination for so-called nihilistic violent extremism (NVE), school attacks or the incel culture. CTA notes that there is considerable overlap between these communities.

GORE: VIOLENCE FIXATION AS A MOTIVATING FACTOR

The term gore is often used in research to describe extremely transgressive content with highly graphic depictions of real-life acts of violence, mutilation or humiliation. NVE networks created around this phenomenon are often inspired by misanthropy (hatred of mankind) and nihilism (the belief that life has no meaning). In many cases, this leads to transgressive and violent acts.

Social, psychological and psychiatric factors

CTA assesses that a substantial number of those who find their way into extremist communities experience social, psychological and/or psychiatric challenges that - when combined with the consumption of extremist or violence-promoting material - may increase the risk of violent actions. The communities offer a potential pathway to finding fellowship, meaning and a clearly defined enemy, which carries a risk that individuals experiencing the challenges mentioned above will connect their personal frustrations and needs with extremist narratives. Thus, inner frustration may turn into anger, blame and retaliation directed at perceived enemies.

CTA notes that individuals who harass or threaten public figures often experience serious mental health disorders and are obsessively fixated on a person, an issue or a location, for example. Such individuals are not necessarily motivated by ideology.

In prevention, investigation and prosecution, it can be difficult to determine whether a person is driven by ideology or by personal frustration and issues, when both factors are present. The combination also makes it more difficult to predict the risk of violence and the most likely targets and methods.

FRUSTRATION AS A DRIVER

In research, the term lone-actor grievance-fuelled violence is sometimes used to explain acts of violence, such as terrorist attacks, school attacks and mass killings, committed by lone actors. Such perpetrators often experience social, psychological and/or psychiatric challenges, and express feelings of perceived injustice, frustration, anger and vengeance.

The conflict in Gaza

CTA assesses that the conflict in Gaza continues to affect the threat landscape in Denmark, and that the situation may still prompt both known and unknown threat actors to engage in spontaneous or premeditated violent action, including terrorist attacks.

Since October 2023, the West has seen a number of terrorist attacks, both completed and foiled, with perpetrators referring to the conflict. Some of these perpetrators had ties to militant Islamism or left-wing extremism, while others had no established affiliation with known threat actors. The targets of these types of attack are typically Israeli and/or Jewish.

In recent years, there have also been several arrests in Europe, including Denmark, of individuals with ties to Hamas and other militant Islamist groups involved in the conflict. Some of these individuals are affiliated with organized crime networks in Denmark, among other places. For more on Hamas, see the section on militant Islamism.

The militant Islamist groups Islamic State and al-Qaida continue to exploit the conflict in Gaza - in propaganda and other communication - in their attempt to inspire militant Islamists to carry out attacks in the West.

CTA assesses that the conflict has built onto an established narrative that the West and Muslims are in opposition, which may lead to or reinforce radicalization processes, both now and in the long term.

CTA assesses that the conflict has brought together a number of single-issue actors in Denmark who are focused on inequality narratives, uniting them around the pro-Palestinian agenda and an enemy perception that overlaps with those of Danish left-wing extremists.

CTA assesses that the conflict has reinforced polarizing narratives online in recent years. These narratives may have a mobilizing and radicalizing effect and contribute to the legitimization of violence among groups with no existing connection to extremist communities. ■



STATE ACTORS AND THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK

01

State actors and the terrorist threat to Denmark

Terrorism, potentially through proxies, can be a convenient instrument for a state seeking to harm or weaken an adversary without crossing the threshold of armed conflict. Such attacks may occur in countries directly involved in a conflict, or in third countries that are merely used as arenas for that conflict.

CTA assesses that such attacks will typically target specific objectives rather than random civilians, unlike for example militant Islamist attacks, which often target large public gatherings. However, the use of proxies increases the risk of misunderstanding and error, because they can be difficult to control.

CTA assesses that the involvement of state actors can significantly impact the terrorist threat due to their extensive capabilities. Furthermore, CTA assesses that state actors' use of organized criminals as proxies can significantly impact the terrorist threat due to the criminals' readiness for violence and their access to weapons and explosives.

CTA assesses that state actors may also engage in influence operations to promote polarization and extremism with the objective of harming adversaries in a hybrid war and – in the most extreme case – to influence extremists into carrying out terrorist attacks that serve the interests of the state actors.

CTA assesses that Iran currently has a stronger intent to direct or support violent acts in Europe, including Denmark, targeting Israeli and Jewish interests and certain Iranian dissidents, and that such acts, depending on the specific circumstances, could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism.

Iran

The conflict between Iran and Israel has escalated in recent years. Since February 2026, Israel and the US have launched attacks on Iran, and Iran has retaliated with attacks on Israeli and US targets in the Middle East. This war has a spillover effect on the threat landscape in the West, including Denmark. CTA assesses that threats may come from a variety of actors, including single-issue actors and actors with ties to either the Iranian regime or terrorist groups. Since 28 February 2026, there have been attacks on Israeli, Jewish and US interests in the West. The situation remains volatile, and developments both in and outside the Middle East are difficult to predict. This means that the threat landscape in Denmark may also change at very short notice.

There are no indications that Iran considers itself in a conflict with Denmark. From an Iranian perspective, Denmark is but one arena among several where the regime can wage their conflicts and wars.

The Iranian regime has long focused on selected interests in the West, including Denmark, targeting them through a variety of means, including means that, depending on the specific circumstances, could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism. The emphasis is especially on Israeli and Jewish interests. At the same time, the Iranian regime considers it a threat to its survival when certain Iranian dissidents or insurgency groups around the world are working to overthrow the regime. Thus, in an effort to ensure the regime's survival and send a clear message, Iran continuously seeks to attack opponents and critics both in and outside the Middle East.

In Denmark, Iran's actions currently pose a threat to Israeli and Jewish interests as well as certain Iranian dissidents. Attacks against these targets could, depending on the specific circumstances, meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism.

CTA assesses that the threat in Denmark is directed towards the Israeli embassy as well as individuals, locations, institutions and companies that, from an Iranian perspective, can be associated with Israel or Judaism, including companies which Iran believes are delivering weapons to Israel.

The Iranian threat to the targets listed above emanates from the Iranian intelligence services, which often use proxies to perform the attacks. For instance, Swedish authorities confirmed in May 2024 that crime networks in Sweden are carrying out attacks on behalf of Iran.

Over the past years, Iran has extensively used contacts within criminal networks as proxies to prepare or carry out attacks in Europe, among other places. When a task is outsourced through multiple intermediaries as a paid service (Crime-as-a-Service), the connection to Iran becomes obfuscated, and the Iranian intelligence services are less exposed.

In 2025, examples also emerged of Iranian intelligence services directly recruiting operatives in Europe and tasking them with attacking Israeli or Jewish targets. For instance, in June and November 2025, two men were arrested in Denmark and extradited to Germany, where they are suspected of conducting intelligence activity and planning attacks on behalf of an Iranian intelligence service.

MORE ABOUT STATE ACTORS


For more information on threats from state actors and their intentions and capabilities, see *Assessment of the Espionage Threat to Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland*, published by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), and *Intelligence Outlook*, published by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS). These publications are available on the websites of PET and DDIS, respectively.

MILITANT ISLAMISM

02

DEFINITION

Militant Islamism is an interpretation of Islamist ideology which legitimizes and accepts the use of violence to achieve political, religious or ideological ends.



Introduction

CTA assesses that the threat to Denmark from militant Islamists is at the level of **significant**. The number of attacks in the West is at a high level, and CTA assesses that individuals and groups both in Denmark and abroad still have the capability and intent to attack targets in Denmark.

The threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad from militant Islamism primarily emanates from the groups Islamic State and al-Qaida and their sympathizers. These groups have a strong presence in a number of non-Western countries and still intend to carry out attacks in the West, including Denmark. Furthermore, they remain capable of inspiring and supporting sympathizers in the West to carry out attacks. There are still groups and individuals in Denmark who sympathize with Islamic State or al-Qaida, and who continually seek to promote their agendas.

CTA notes that, over the past year, militant Islamists have directed less attention towards Denmark in relation to perceived insults to Islam compared to 2023 and 2024. Furthermore, militant Islamists in Denmark are currently less focused on attack planning and more on recruitment and radicalization. If this reduced focus on attack planning continues, the threat to Denmark from militant Islamists could diminish.

The most likely militant Islamist attack in Denmark is an attack by an individual or a small group, primarily radicalized online and with no or only peripheral contact to established in-person communities. Both militant Islamists living in Denmark and arriving from abroad may pose a threat. The most likely targets, in no particular order, are large public gatherings, authority targets, Jewish/Israeli targets, targets associated with perceived insults to Islam and LGBT+ targets.

PERCEIVED INSULTS TO ISLAM AND THE THREAT TO DENMARK

Over the past 20 years, cases of perceived insults to Islam have had a considerable effect on the terrorist threat to Denmark. The so-called cartoon controversy, which began with the printing of satirical cartoons in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005, and which was refuelled when a number of Danish media outlets reprinted the cartoons in 2008, continues to be a point of reference for militant Islamists. Over the years, the Danish courts have heard a number of terror cases against militant Islamists in Denmark that involved perceived insults to Islam in various ways.

In 2023, Quran desecrations, mainly in Denmark and Sweden, renewed the perception of Denmark as a priority target for militant Islamist groups, resulting in threats against Denmark, individuals in Denmark and Danish interests abroad. Since 2024, militant Islamists have been less focused on insults to Islam. However, CTA assesses that the Quran desecrations in 2023 – like the cartoon controversy – have become a reference point for militant Islamists. Thus, perceived insults to Islam continue to affect the threat to Denmark from militant Islamists.

This potential threat originates not only from individuals within Denmark, but also from militant Islamists abroad who, driven by perceived insults to Islam, may travel to Denmark to carry out attacks. They could be individuals or small groups, inspired, supported or directed by a militant Islamist group or another actor, potentially a state actor. If new instances of perceived insults gain publicity, the focus could quickly shift back to Denmark, individuals in Denmark or Danish interests abroad as prioritized targets. Moreover, reactions to perceived insults may occur with a considerable delay.

Militant Islamist groups outside the West

Islamic State and al-Qaida – along with their affiliated subgroups and sympathizers – continue to pose a threat to the West, including Denmark. Both groups maintain a strong presence in several locations across Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. This presence may exacerbate the threat by strengthening transnational connections, enhancing their capability to support and direct attacks in the West and facilitating a renewed influx of foreign fighters to the groups.

THE THREAT TO THE WEST FROM MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS ABROAD

In Intelligence Outlook 2025, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) assesses that weak governments, internal power struggles and, in some cases, armed conflicts across the Middle East create space for militant Islamist groups to expand their presence in these states, most notably in Syria, where the security situation remains precarious a year after the fall of the Assad regime. DDIS further states that Islamic State and al-Qaida are set to continue expanding across fragile African states, where both groups continue to pose a threat to Western targets in Africa, such as embassies. Also, in recent years, the risk of kidnapping, particularly of Western citizens, has increased, although al-Qaida and Islamic State in Africa still primarily target local security forces and civilians. Furthermore, DDIS states that Islamic State has managed to draw foreign fighters to several parts of Africa, primarily from other African countries but also from Europe.

CTA assesses that the developments in Syria currently do not directly impact the terrorist threat to Denmark. However, the instability may strengthen Islamic State and other militant Islamist groups in the region, which may contribute to increasing the terrorist threat to the West, including Denmark, in the longer term. A few of the individuals from Denmark who have travelled to and remain in the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq may pose a threat to Denmark or Danish interests abroad. Whether this is the case is subject to a specific assessment of the individual's possible intent and capability. It will be difficult for these individuals to return to Denmark in the short term without assistance from Danish or foreign authorities.

CTA assesses that Islamic State and al-Qaida continually work to develop and enhance their ability to attack targets in the West by building their capability to direct and support attacks.

However, CTA assesses that it is **less likely** that Islamic State and al-Qaida will obtain the capability to carry out large, complex attacks in Europe in the short term. CTA assesses that the threat to the West, including Denmark, will increase in the short term if the efforts to fight Islamic State, al-Qaida and their affiliated subgroups are reduced, as this would allow the groups more space to build their capabilities. Furthermore, it is **possible** that this would make it easier to join the groups as a foreign fighter. The use of refugee and migrant routes has previously been a key element of Islamic State attack planning against targets in Europe, and it is **likely** that militant Islamists still intend to exploit available routes.

Islamic State and al-Qaida both continue to produce new propaganda, while substantial amounts of old propaganda are still distributed online. Among many other purposes, the propaganda aims to recruit new supporters, raise funds, legitimize acts of violence and call for attacks against the West. The propaganda also influences radicalization and may, over time, inspire sympathizers by consistently highlighting specific targets and methods as legitimate and effective, respectively. CTA assesses that perceived insults to Islam – including the cartoon controversy in the 2000s and the Quran desecrations in the early 2020s – have become reference points in militant Islamist propaganda with a potential to affect the terrorist threat to Denmark. Although some propaganda continues to be published through official Islamic State and al-Qaida media channels, much of it also appears through unofficial support groups, and a significant portion is produced by sympathizers. This part of the propaganda is distributed through online platforms, often targeting a young audience (see the section on developments in online technology).

ISLAMIC STATE AND AL-QAIDA SUBGROUPS

Both Islamic State and al-Qaida have regional subgroups that have pledged allegiance to them. Examples of Islamic State subgroups include Islamic State in Khorasan (operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan), Islamic State in West Africa (operating in Nigeria) and Islamic State in Somalia. Examples of al-Qaida subgroups include al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (operating in Yemen) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (operating in Sahel). The threat to the West, including Denmark, posed by each of the subgroups changes continuously with local conditions, group priorities and counter-terrorism efforts.

Trends in the West

Following a slight decline in the number of completed and foiled militant Islamist attacks in the West in 2021-2022, the level rose again in 2023 and has since remained at two to three completed and foiled attacks every month on average. CTA assesses that single events, such as perceived insults to Islam, or a uniting cause, such as the conflict in Gaza, can influence the number of attacks in a given period. There is still a tendency for militant Islamist attacks in the West to be carried out using easily accessible means, such as knives and vehicles, and for the attacks to be carried out by individuals or small groups who have no links to established militant Islamist groups. They do, however, often have contact to other militant Islamists, primarily online. CTA notes that there has been an increase in the number of completed and foiled attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets since 2023. However, the designated targets were most often random civilian targets and authority targets.

In recent years, youth and minors have been involved in a number of completed and foiled attacks in the West. CTA assesses that this may reflect a trend of a new generation of young militant Islamists being radicalized, primarily online and without any contact to known offline networks, as a result of exposure to militant Islamist content on social media. Such content includes propaganda videos and pictures, often produced with an aesthetic meant to appeal to young people. CTA assesses that several of the young individuals who are radicalized online show no strong ideological loyalty, but they may be fascinated, for example, by Islamic State, al-Qaida and extreme violence with no ideological motivation. CTA assesses that these factors serve to increase the number of individuals with a potential for radicalization (see the sections on developments in online technology, the conflict in Gaza and extreme violence with unclear motives).

Over the past year, terror convicts have been involved in attack planning and attacks in the West after their release from prison. CTA therefore assesses that released terror convicts may pose a threat, also in Denmark.

CTA further assesses that militant Islamism in the West generally is characterized by an ever-growing trend towards internationalization, reflected in communication and networking across national borders and in continuous attempts at and interest in travelling abroad to join, particularly, Islamic State subgroups outside the West. Militant Islamists joining Islamic State subgroups abroad could, through their networks, contribute to attack planning against the West, including Denmark, and facilitate other militant Islamists joining Islamic State.

THE THREAT FROM HAMAS TO THE WEST

In October and November 2025, a number of individuals were arrested in Germany, including one Danish resident. According to German prosecutors, the individuals are suspected of involvement in the acquisition of weapons intended for Hamas attacks against Israeli or Jewish institutions in Germany. CTA is not aware of any previous Hamas attacks against targets in Europe. CTA assesses that acts of terrorism in Europe, including Denmark, would mark a significant shift from the group's previous focus and strategic interests. CTA assesses that the group has so far primarily viewed Europe as a logistical and financial support base for its activities in the Middle East. However, in recent years, Hamas has experienced significant losses, both operationally and in its leadership. These factors may have affected the group's previous strategic approach to attacking Jewish and Israeli targets outside the region. At the same time, this may have contributed to a fragmentation of Hamas, which could increase the risk that elements of the group operate without central coordination or approval.

THE THREAT TO DANISH INTERESTS IN NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES

CTA assesses that Danish diplomatic representations and other Danish presence in non-Western countries, including employees of Danish companies, may be considered symbolic targets, offering a way to inflict harm on Denmark without committing an attack in Denmark. However, CTA is not aware of threats specifically targeting Danish interests or Danes in non-Western countries in 2025.

Trends in Denmark

The threat from militant Islamists in Denmark is currently centred less on attacks and more on recruitment, radicalization, capability building – for example of Islamic State networks abroad – and joining Islamic State subgroups in Africa and the Middle East, among other places.

CTA assesses that Denmark, like the West generally, continues to see an overall trend towards internationalization among militant Islamists who sympathize with Islamic State or al-Qaida. In Denmark, some militant Islamists only have contact to like-minded individuals abroad, for example via transnational online networks, while others are also part of offline networks of like-minded individuals in Denmark. Both segments include individuals with contact to Islamic State subgroups outside the West. In the short term, such contacts can contribute to attack planning in the West, including in Denmark, and to facilitation of people travelling to join Islamic State subgroups abroad. CTA assesses that there are militant Islamists in Denmark who wish to join Islamic State subgroups outside the West. They are particularly attracted to the subgroups that are currently gaining momentum, and the interest in joining, notably, Islamic State in Syria is going to increase in the short term if the group is strengthened

locally. In the longer term, this may affect the threat to Denmark. It is **likely** that the desire to join Islamic State subgroups will persist in the coming year.

CTA assesses that militant Islamists in Denmark are providing funds for militant Islamists groups or individuals abroad. While this type of terrorist financing has no direct impact on the terrorist threat to Denmark, the activities help to strengthen and support militant Islamist organizations and individuals abroad, thereby indirectly maintaining the threat to Denmark.

CTA assesses that there are still radicalizers and radicalizing groups in Denmark, with networks across the country, that serve as rallying points for individuals sympathizing with militant Islamism. These radicalizers and groups provide a framework for social and religious activities, while at the same time attracting and acting as a hub for new sympathisers and members, who may potentially pose a threat.

Militant Islamists in Denmark continue to be involved in both local and transnational online groups and networks, where they communicate with like-minded individuals and share propaganda. It is **likely** that these online groups and networks include very young individuals. CTA assesses that some individuals in Denmark are following both Danish and Western radicalizers on various online platforms that do not explicitly call for violence, but where militant Islamists are also active. An initial contact on these platforms can be a stepping stone to closed networks (see the section on developments in online technology).

Militant Islamists are thus involved in a range of activities that serve to support and promote terrorism and foster radicalization. CTA assesses that the trends and developments described above will continue in the coming year. Combined with the momentum of Islamic State and al-Qaida outside the West, this represents a continued threat to Denmark. ■

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

DEFINITION

Right-wing extremism is a generic term covering various political views on the far right of the political spectrum which legitimize and accept the use of violence to achieve political and ideological ends.

03

Introduction

CTA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark from right-wing extremists is at the level of **general**. CTA assesses that there are individuals or small groups with ties to the right-wing extremist community who have the capability and/or intent to carry out terrorist attacks against targets in Denmark.

The threat from right-wing extremism emanates primarily from individuals who have been radicalized in right-wing extremist networks online, but CTA assesses that individuals on the periphery of established offline networks may also pose a threat. Due in part to the online development, the right-wing extremist threat now also includes very young individuals, who

may sometimes experience social, psychological and/or psychiatric challenges (see the sections on developments in online technology and social, psychological and psychiatric factors).

The most likely terrorist attack by right-wing extremists in Denmark is an attack carried out by an individual or a small group of individuals. The most likely specific or symbolic targets of a right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark, in no particular order, are authority targets, infrastructure targets, LGBT+ targets and targets perceived as threats to “the white race”, including individuals, locations and/or events associated with Jews and Muslims.

Trends in the West

In recent years, the number of completed and foiled right-wing extremist attacks in the West has remained at a relatively stable average of one per month. The general right-wing extremist trends in the West primarily unfold online, where right-wing extremists interact anonymously and across national borders. Alongside this, an increase has been observed in transnational connections between right-wing extremist in-person groups.


CTA assesses that the development of right-wing extremism in the West is currently marked by a growing number of young people in extremist online communities and by the emergence of new extremist communities that include elements of right-wing extremism, but are driven more by a fascination with violence than by ideology (see the section on extreme violence with unclear motives). Thus, right-wing extremism in the West covers a spectrum ranging from traditional Nazis with a clear ideology, organizational structure and hierarchy, to loose, post-organizational network structures, where individuals often adopt only selected elements of right-wing extremism to form their own hybrid and individually constructed world views. Recent trends, such as state actors forming part of the terrorist threat landscape, can also potentially influence right-wing extremist communities in the West and the threat posed by them.

RUSSIA COULD EXPLOIT EXTREMISTS

Russia has a long tradition of supporting and exerting influence on individuals and groups in the West, with the aim of gaining ideological backing, destabilizing Western societies or generating public resistance against Western collaborations and alliances. In the most extreme case, Russian influence on extremist communities could incite actions that, depending on the specific circumstances, could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism.

There are indications that Russian actors have increasingly turned their focus on right-wing and anti-establishment extremists in the West in recent years, as they can be effective instruments in the ongoing hybrid war against the West. For example, actors with links to Russia are suspected of having disseminated and attempted to amplify a number of narratives in connection with a series of violent right-wing and anti-establishment extremist riots in the United Kingdom in 2024.

Based on this, CTA assesses that extremist communities may serve as a tool for actors with links to Russia who seek to polarize and destabilize the internal situation in the West and in Denmark, for example by exploiting existing divisions and/or distrust in institutions and authorities in Western societies.



Extremist actors often participate in a large number of different online milieus simultaneously.

Trends in Denmark

Right-wing extremism in Denmark is currently characterized by several parallel trends. One trend involves ideologically motivated accelerationist online communities (see box on right-wing extremist modus operandi), where a segment of typically young individuals celebrate and encourage violent acts and terrorist attacks. Recruitment takes place through propaganda disseminated online and through targeted outreach by right-wing extremist radicalizers, who guide individuals to encrypted and closed right-wing extremist groups and forums where radicalization occurs. A number of individuals in this right-wing extremist segment experience social, psychological and/or psychiatric challenges. The threat from these right-wing extremists primarily concerns individuals and solo attacks.

Another trend involves the same kind of individuals and online structures, but is rooted in an unclear or fragmented affiliation with right-wing extremism. Ideological visions of the ideal society play only a minor role, but right-wing extremist aesthetics and symbolism are imitated and shared alongside other extremist material – for example abuse videos – in online communities united by a fascination with violence. Thus, elements of right-wing extremism serve as a “backdrop” for different kinds of extremist behaviour that fall outside the traditional threat categories, but that could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism, depending on the specific circumstances. Examples include violence-fixated communities sharing a fascination for nihilistic violent extremism (NVE), school attacks and/or the incel culture (see the section on extreme violence with unclear motives). For instance, right-wing extremist perpetrators are often celebrated across these violence-fixated cultures, and several school attacks committed in the West in recent years have adopted right-wing extremist aesthetics. This hybridization of the terrorist threat is usually driven more by a fascination with violence, poor mental health and individual preferences than by ideology. Thus, the threat posed by this type of extremists is of a diverse and volatile nature, although a common denominator is the focus on and fascination with violent acts and terrorist attacks.

The right-wing extremist scene in Denmark also includes young men focused on martial arts and organizing in communities with traditional offline structures. This segment is recruiting individuals seeking a society based on order and ideology. The profiles in this segment are thus pursuing elements of the right-wing extremist world view that differ from the two trends described above – including hierarchy and structure. These right-wing extremist communities are characterized by stronger transnational cooperation, with travels to and visits from like-minded individuals abroad. Currently, the threat posed by right-wing extremists in these communities is centred less on attacks and more on recruitment, capability building and radicalization, along with efforts to steer public discourse towards right-wing extremist views. An example of this trend is the so-called Active Clubs, which focus on practising martial arts and cultivating right-wing extremist narratives. CTA assesses that this segment of right-wing extremists has gained increased support in the West over the past year.

CTA assesses that right-wing extremist online radicalization will continue in the coming year. CTA further assesses that young people experiencing poor well-being will be a key component of the right-wing extremist threat landscape. CTA assesses that these two developments will overlap with other related forms of extremism, and that the number of cases involving elements of hybridization, including varying degrees of right-wing extremism, will increase.

Finally, CTA assesses that a number of macro trends – including developments in online technologies (see the section on developments in online technology), polarization, migration pressure and growing distrust in the democratic form of government and politicians in the West – could potentially strengthen and/or influence right-wing extremists and ultimately lead to right-wing extremist violence against perceived enemies. ■

RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST MODUS OPERANDI AND AESTHETICS IN NON-IDEOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES

SIEGE was the name of a newsletter published by the American neo-Nazi James Mason in the 1980s. Mason's writings and world view constitute the ideological foundation of the right-wing extremist SIEGE culture, where accelerationism is a tenet. Accelerationism encapsulates the belief that societal collapse must be accelerated, using terrorism as a tool to destabilize society. Actual SIEGE groups typically consist of ideological right-wing extremists, while the accelerationist modus operandi and the SIEGE culture aesthetics, with its explicit glorification of violence and use of elements such as skull masks, have also been adopted by extremists without a clear ideological basis, for example NVE networks and other violence-fixated communities.



LEFT-WING EXTREMISM

04

DEFINITION

Left-wing extremism is a generic term covering various political views on the far left of the political spectrum which legitimize and accept the use of violence to achieve political and ideological ends.

Introduction

CTA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark from left-wing extremists is at the level of **limited**. CTA assesses that there is limited intent among left-wing extremists to carry out terrorist attacks against targets in Denmark. However, CTA assesses that some individuals or small groups with ties to the left-wing extremist community hold the capability to carry out terrorist attacks.

The threat from left-wing extremism primarily emanates from small in-person groups united around anarchist and anti-fascist narratives, and from newly established and loosely structured activity-based networks focused on the revived pro-Palestinian agenda. The focus on this agenda has broadened the left-wing extremist enemy concept to include not only perceived right-wing extremists, but also Danish politicians, authorities and companies considered to be affiliated with pro-Israel narratives. The threat from left-wing extremists has thereby become more unpredictable.

CTA assesses that the most likely terrorist attack by left-wing extremists in Denmark will target buildings and/or critical infrastructure (e.g. energy and transport) that hold symbolic value and align with left-wing extremist narratives such as anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism or anti-fascism. An attack of this nature would most likely be carried out by a small group.

Trends in the West

For a number of years, left-wing extremist attacks in Europe have not resulted in any fatalities. Left-wing extremists generally resort to violence against individuals only when these are perceived as right-wing extremists or in confrontations with the police. The most common attack method is arson.

Left-wing extremist communities throughout Europe widely use online platforms for knowledge sharing and campaigns in order to foster solidarity and inspire actions across national borders. The dominant agendas in left-wing extremist communities in Europe continue to be anti-fascism, climate, anarchism, anti-imperialism and anti-militarism. The ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Europe have intensified the communities' focus on the two latter agendas and have united groups engaged in traditional left-wing inequality agendas, which they link to the pro-Palestinian cause.

The UK group Palestine Action, whose enemy perception and ideological narrative have significant overlaps with European left-wing extremists, has carried out a series of actions based on the pro-Palestinian agenda. Two of these actions – against a weapons factory and a Royal Air Force transport plane – have led the authorities to charge several members of Palestine Action under UK terrorism law, and in July 2025, Palestine Action was officially proscribed as a terrorist organization in the UK. At the time of release of this publication, this decision is being challenged before the courts.

CTA assesses that the pro-Palestinian agenda is the main reason left-wing extremist communities across Europe continue to build legitimacy and attract sympathizers.

Trends in Denmark

The pro-Palestinian agenda also continues to dominate the left-wing extremist community in Denmark. Moreover, the conflict in Gaza has given renewed legitimacy to traditional left-wing narratives, such as anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-militarism, and has united a number of actors engaged in single-issue agendas around a common perceived enemy. This has given momentum to the left-wing extremist community, expanding its recruitment base and providing a clear platform for action.

Based on this development, CTA assesses that there are currently two overlapping main segments within the left-wing extremist community in Denmark: a segment driven by anti-fascist agendas and with a high degree of formal organization, and a new growing segment with a more loosely structured organization, comprising action-oriented individuals driven by anti-imperialist agendas, such as the pro-Palestinian cause and the climate cause.

CTA assesses that the new segment within the left-wing extremist community is contributing to an increase in the number and severity of left-wing extremist actions. Thus, over the past year, individuals within the community have been responsible for a variety of actions targeting authorities, embassies and companies – as well as their employees – which they link to pro-Israel narratives. In this context, Danish left-wing extremists have demonstrated the capability to facilitate and carry out actions involving participants from a wide range of countries, and they have expanded their contacts to international left-wing extremists.

There are also examples of the pro-Palestinian agenda inciting parts of the community to harass individuals who can be linked to organizations or companies perceived as pro-Israel. This marks a break with former target selection in the community, as actions related to the pro-Palestinian agenda have previously been targeted mainly at symbolic material targets.

The new segment within the left-wing extremist community, driven by the pro-Palestinian agenda, is largely organized in online networks with many international contacts. CTA assesses that this development could result in a greater reliance on online organization of left-wing extremist activities, thereby increasing volatility and uncertainty regarding the goals and methods of the community (see the section on developments in online technology).

CTA assesses that the left-wing extremist community will continue to rally around the pro-Palestinian agenda. If the conflict in Gaza subsides, or if lasting peace is achieved, it is **likely** that the recruitment base will shrink. If the conflict flares up, it may incite the community to further engagement in anti-imperialist and anti-militarist narratives. This could lead to confrontations with the authorities and potentially trigger a radicalization spiral with increased legitimization of violent action.

If the pro-Palestinian agenda loses its current relevance, CTA assesses that the community will seek to maintain the momentum it has gained by shifting its focus to, for example, the climate agenda as a rallying point. ■

An aerial photograph of a streambed. The streambed is composed of grey rocks and pebbles, with patches of green moss and small plants. The surrounding area is covered in dense, brown, tufted grasses. The overall color palette is earthy, with browns, greys, and muted greens.

05

ANTI- ESTABLISHMENT EXTREMISM

DEFINITION

Anti-establishment extremism refers to a non-ideological and often conspiracy theory-driven community that fully or partially rejects existing national and international institutions of authority, and that legitimizes and accepts the use of violence to achieve political ends.

Introduction

CTA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark from anti-establishment extremists is at the level of **limited**. CTA assesses that there is limited capability and intent among anti-establishment extremists to carry out terrorist attacks against targets in Denmark.

The threat from anti-establishment extremism primarily emanates from individuals who directly or indirectly legitimize violence through conspiracy narratives shared in mainstream online forums, potentially influencing susceptible individuals, among others, to take violent action.

CTA assesses that the most likely terrorist attack by anti-establishment extremists against targets in Denmark will be directed at an individual or an authority with negative exposure in an anti-establishment extremist narrative. An attack of this nature will be carried out by an individual or a small group of individuals who have visited anti-establishment extremist online forums. Potential targets, in no particular order, are politicians, the police and public-sector employees as well as critical infrastructure.

Trends in the West

The attacks carried out by anti-establishment extremists in the West in recent years have particularly been directed at individuals perceived as representing the authorities and have been motivated by conspiracy beliefs about the authorities' abuse of power. The target selection reflects a general and growing trend in the West towards intimidation and threats against politicians, public officials and experts.

Moreover, the anti-establishment extremist community in the West is constantly influenced by political trends in the United States, where conspiracy theories have entered the mainstream political debate. This may have a knock-on effect on other Western countries. It is less likely that such an effect would lead to violent actions in Denmark, but it is likely that it can result in further dissemination of conspiracy theories and mis/disinformation, thereby fostering polarization and amplifying enemy perceptions.

POLARIZATION

Increased polarization in Western societies can lead to fellow citizens, public officials and politicians being viewed not only as political opponents, but as enemies that must be fought. This challenges the democratic foundation of society. The trend is also visible in Denmark, where conspiracy theories about "corrupt" and "evil" elites have been propagated in extremist communities. These communities foster echo chambers, where anti-establishment extremists make unchallenged claims that build up, confirm and reinforce each other's world views, thereby contributing to the perceived "us versus them" mentality.

State actors can leverage polarization trends to create further distrust of fellow citizens, public institutions, public officials and politicians. This can have a negative impact on social cohesion and increase the risk of radicalization into extremist communities (see the box Russia could exploit extremists in the section on right-wing extremism).

Trends in Denmark

The anti-establishment extremist community in Denmark is characterized by high online activity on open social media, such as Facebook and X, where recruitment and mobilization primarily take place. However, the community does not currently have a major mobilizing cause. There is limited activity in the offline space, although there are attempts to establish offline groups. Such groups could complement the online activities in the community and serve as tangible evidence of the community's existence and the widespread public opposition that it claims to represent.

Harassment of politicians, both in person and online, remains a dominant trend in the Danish anti-establishment extremist community. Additionally, there has been a development in the community towards even more widespread acceptance of harassment of politicians, also within their private sphere, and individuals who carry out such harassment are lauded as heroes. CTA assesses that threats against politicians and physical confrontations with them represent a current threat potential, as susceptible individuals – including people experiencing social, psychological and/or psychiatric challenges – may consider it legitimate to escalate the harassment into violence. CTA further notes that harassment and threats against politicians pose a long-term threat to democracy, as elected politicians may be deterred from taking on public duties.

People in the anti-establishment extremist community are keen users of alternative, often international news sources due to a general distrust of public authorities and traditional news media. CTA assesses that individuals within the anti-establishment extremist community may be easily influenced and repeat news that often contains mis/disinformation. In this context, CTA assesses that anti-establishment extremists may potentially be exploited by foreign stakeholders to – usually unknowingly – spread narratives aimed at increasing polarization and division in Western societies.

Furthermore, the Danish anti-establishment extremist community continues to take an opportunistic approach to cultivating new causes and focus areas. CTA assesses that the community attempts to frame their protests

as a class struggle, where "the people" are fighting "the elite". CTA assesses that the community generally seeks to exploit this dynamic in all areas with potential for conflict between groups of citizens and the authorities.

CTA assesses that societal macro trends, including increased polarization and higher costs of living, could lead to more distrust and contempt towards the authorities, thereby potentially contributing to the continued recruitment and support for the anti-establishment extremist community and its activities.

THREAT-INDUCING NARRATIVES

Anti-establishment extremists focus on general and topical issues that may have broad appeal in society. These issues are often interpreted within a framework of conspiracy theories and linked to threat-inducing narratives, for instance portraying the government as illegitimate and therefore subject to punishment by "the people". If the government or the state is generally considered to be illegitimate, it may potentially foster acceptance of using violent means to fight these institutions.

Threat-inducing narratives can be characterized as extremist because they legitimize violence and thereby have the potential to incite the use of violence. Due to the propagation of threat-inducing narratives, the threat from anti-establishment extremists may manifest itself as violent attacks, primarily targeting individuals, or as a long-term threat to the democratic foundation of society.

The threat from the anti-establishment extremist community stems, among other factors, from individuals who have low online activity, but who passively consume the threat-inducing narratives and conspiracy theories developed and shared by central actors in the community. There have been examples in the West of such individuals acting violently against the authorities.

THE TERRORIST THREAT TO GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDS

06



6.1 The terrorist threat to Greenland

The terrorist threat to Greenland remains at the level of **minimal**.

It is **likely** that the trend in recent years towards hybridization of the terrorist threat, increasing online activity in extremist communities and a growing number of young people in extremist communities may affect the threat landscape in Greenland in the same way that it affects other parts of the Kingdom of Denmark.

However, CTA assesses that violent extremism is less widespread in Greenland than in Denmark. Yet, extremist propaganda may still influence individuals in Greenland to commit acts of violence.

CTA assesses that the international attention on Greenland and the intensified debates about international security could potentially contribute to polarization and radicalization, which may affect the threat landscape in Greenland.

CTA assesses that the easy access to weapons and explosives in Greenland might raise the possibility of performing a high-impact attack.

6.2 The terrorist threat to the Faroe Islands

The terrorist threat to the Faroe Islands remains at the level of **minimal**.

It is likely that the trend in recent years towards hybridization of the terrorist threat, increasing online activity in extremist communities and a growing number of young people in extremist communities may affect the threat landscape in the Faroe Islands in the same way that it affects other parts of the Kingdom of Denmark.

However, CTA assesses that violent extremism is less widespread in the Faroe Islands than in Denmark. Yet, extremist propaganda may still influence individuals living in or travelling to the Faroe Islands to commit acts of violence. This may be triggered by political single issues, such as animal welfare.

07

MODUS OPERANDI

CTA assesses that terrorists' choice of modus operandi is determined by a number of factors, including trends in propaganda and on online platforms, the perpetrator's capability, the intended target and inspiration from other attacks. The capability in extremist communities may be enhanced through recruitment or radicalization of key figures with legitimate access to facilities, resources or information.

The following sections describe the modi operandi that CTA assesses to be most likely in connection with a terrorist attack in Denmark.



7.1 Easily accessible means, firearms and improvised explosive devices

Terrorist attacks with easily accessible means can be carried out spontaneously or following a very short planning phase. In Denmark, easily accessible means mainly include bladed weapons, bludgeons, incendiary devices and vehicles. Attacks with easily accessible means may cause major harm.

CTA assesses that there are extremists in Denmark with access and capability to use firearms in terrorist attacks.

According to CTA's assessment, there are extremists in Denmark with the capability to make small improvised explosive devices and use these for terrorist attacks. Instructions and manuals on how to make various explosives and improvised explosive devices are available online and can be used by people with no prior training.

Production of improvised explosives is subject to a number of barriers, including restrictions on the sale of substances used to manufacture the explosives.

Some criminal networks in Denmark have contacts that enable procurement of factory-made explosives. Increased availability of such explosives may ease the production of improvised explosive devices for potential terrorist use. Furthermore, some criminal networks have contacts that enable procurement of hand grenades. The grenade attack near the Israeli embassy in Copenhagen in October 2024 illustrates how such means can be used to commit acts that, depending on the specific circumstances, could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism.

CTA assesses that radicalized individuals who have received weapons training in a conflict zone such as Syria, Iraq or Ukraine, or who have knowledge of weapons from military service, shooting clubs, criminal networks or elsewhere will be able to carry out high-impact attacks.



7.2 Improvised firearms

Developments in 3D printing technology have made the manufacturing of improvised firearms far more accessible than previously. This has made it possible to bypass traditional barriers set up to control the access to firearms. Several online communities focusing on this topic have emerged. In these communities, files and instructions are developed, designed and shared. With these files and commercially available 3D printers, people can manufacture their own firearms and/or components for factory-made firearms.

Despite the files and instructions circulating online, CTA assesses that certain barriers still exist that prevent individuals from manufacturing and using improvised firearms, including the acquisition of ammunition. However, CTA assesses that the continuous technological development in this area will gradually make it easier and cheaper to acquire and use improvised firearms.



7.3 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

For a number of years, weaponized UAVs have been used in and around conflict zones such as Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza, and militant groups in these areas have demonstrated proficiency in the use of UAVs in attacks.

CTA is not aware of any terrorist attacks in the West carried out with weaponized UAVs, but CTA has information about foiled attacks in the West potentially involving the use of UAVs. In Denmark, final judgment was passed in 2021 against three individuals who were sentenced to imprisonment for ten years, four and a half years, and three years, respectively, in a case concerning shipment of UAV equipment to Islamic State in Syria.

Weaponizing a UAV for use in a terrorist attack requires financial resources, technical know-how and access to explosives. However, CTA assesses that the continuous technological development in this area will gradually make it easier and cheaper to acquire UAVs with the aim of weaponizing them.

The potential disruptive effect of UAVs on critical infrastructure could be utilized in connection with acts that, depending on the specific circumstances, could meet the Danish legal definition of terrorism. CTA assesses that flights of this nature would require a UAV pilot with technical knowledge and a certain amount of planning.



7.4 Chemical and biological agents

CTA assesses that there is limited capability among extremists in Denmark to weaponize biological agents or carry out chemical attacks using means other than unprocessed substances. However, various extremist propaganda publications have recurrently focused on the use of chemical agents, and militant Islamists in the West have occasionally attempted to manufacture various chemical substances. CTA assesses that there are extremists in Denmark who would be able to produce certain toxins suitable for use in a simple biological attack. However, the execution of an attack would also require insight into efficient means of dispersion of the agent.

In 2023, a person was arrested on suspicion of attempting to carry out a militant Islamist attack in Germany using ricin and cyanide. This illustrates the continued interest from militant Islamists in carrying out attacks using chemical and biological agents. However, CTA is not aware of such agents having been successfully used to carry out terrorist attacks in the West. ■





Center for Terroranalyse

CTA

POLITIETS
EFTERRETNINGSTJENESTE
KLAUSDALSBROVEJ 1
2860 SØBORG

+45 45 15 90 07
PET@PET.DK
WWW.PET.DK